Introduction
(1) There are special provision and special machinery to deal with civil disputes under co-operative law with liberal limitation and special concessional lavad-fees prescribed for the same. They are covered mainly under Section 96 and the jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred under Section 166 of G.C.S, Act, read with Sec. 9 of C.P.C. Therefore, Sec. 96 is incorporated for ready reference before any further discussion:
SEC. 95 : DISPUTES:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time-being in force, any dispute touching the constitution, management or business of a society shall be referred in the prescribed form either by any of the parties to the dispute or by a federal society to which the society is affiliated or by a creditor of the society, to the Registrar if the parties there are from amongst the following.
(A) A society, its committee, any past committee, any past or present agent, any past or present servant or Nominee, heir of legal representative of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased servant of the society, or the liquidator of the society;
(B) A member, past member or a person claiming through a member, past member or a deceased member of society which is a member of the society;
(C) A person, other than member of the society who has been granted a loan by the society, or with whom the society has to had transactions under the provisions of Sec. 46, and any person claiming through such a person:
(D) A surety of member, past member or a deceased member, or a person other than a member who has been granted a loan by the society under section 46, whether such surety is or is not a member of the society;
(E) Any other society or the liquidator of such a society.
(F) When any question arises whether for the purpose of sub. sec.
(1) a matter referred to for decision is a dispute or not, the question shall be considered by the
Registrar, whose decision shall be final.
EXPLANATION – I:- For the purpose of this sub-section, a dispute shall include
(I) A claim by a society for any debt or demand due to it from a member, past member or the nominee, heir or legal representative of a deceased member, without such a debt or demand be admitted or not.
(II) A claim by a surety for any sum or demand due to him from the principal borrower in respect of a loan by a society and recovered from the surety owing to the default of the principal borrower, whether such a sum or demand be admitted or not.
(III) A claim by a society for any loss caused to it by a member past member; or deceased member by any officer, past, officer or deceased officer, by any agent, past agent or deceased agent, or by any servant, past servant or by its committee, past or present whether such loss be admitted or not;
(IV) A refusal or failure by a member, a past member or a nominee, heir or legal representative of a deceased members . to deliver possession to a society of land or any other assets resumed by it for breach of conditions of the assignment.
EXPLANATION – II :- For the purpose of this section, the expression “agent” includes in
the cases of a housing society, an architect, engineer or contractor engaged by the society.
Parties to Dispute
(1) Before we start any discussion, it is important to note that the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court has struck down secs. 96 (c) (d), (e); the words “any past or present agent, deceased agent” and Explanation
– II as ultravires to Art.14 of the Constitution 1971 (XII)-GLR-P-355 in the case of Rasiklal Patel v/s Kailashgauri Mehta. This judgment was challenged before Supreme Court. The same is confirmed by Supreme Court in Distract Registrar. (Assit.) v. Vikrambhai Ratilal Dalal. SCA, No 2153 of 1972 Dtd.27 -11-1986 reported in 1987 Suppl. SCC- 27.
(2) The above judgment has appreciated the situation that the society can avail the special machinery created under statute against non-member and the same is not available for the non member against the society under Sec. 96 read with Section 167. Therefore, two persons similarly situated are discriminated in law and therefore, is ultravires to Art. 14 of the Constitution, particularly builder, architect etc., are out of the net of Sec. 36. Therefore, it is necessary to amend the law to enable nonmember also to sue against the society by suitable amendment to restore Original position of law which
hold good intentions. Such amendment will abrogate the decision of Hon’ble High Court in 1971-GLB355 and disputes with mixed set of parties will be covered to resolve of complication which has arisen by strucking down the original provisions under Sec. 96.
As it stands the parties covered under sec. 96 are discussed as under :
(3) The society is the main party to the dispute since the dispute would invariably be touching the constitution, management or business of a society The society is a body corporate under section 37 and the society is having its supreme authority vested in general body in general meeting under section 73.
Therefore, the society exercises its powers either in the general body under Sec. 73 or by the managing committee as per Sec. 74 If the society is not joined as party in the dispute, it cannot be said to be a dispute under section 96. The internal dispute inter se members in which there is no direct or indirect role of the society is not a dispute under sec. 96. However, whether a society has role is a question of fact related to each case. This has been decided by the Hon’ble ‘. High Court in 1982-GLH (UJ) 8.
(Govindlal Jivanlal Desai v/s Girishchandra Vadilal Vani).
Similarly, legal heirship of a member can be decided under section 31 by the society: but the society cannot be compelled to decide disputed question of legal heirship for which a separate forum of civil court is available. The question of legal heirship is a question f succession for which Succession Law like Hindu Succession Law and Hindu Succession At are there under which civil court has jurisdiction.
Since Succession Law is a special law for succession matters, Registrar’s Nominee has no Jurisdiction.
Since co-operative law is a general law for succession matters, succession law prevails over cooperative Law and therefore, Nominee, has no jurisdiction to decide purely a succession matter, which is not coming under the regular business the society. Therefore, the society is an important and inevitable party either as a plaintiff or defendant whose action is a real cause of dispute touching the business, management and constitution of the society. The other parties to be dispute are either ,aggrieved or connected as beneficiary to the dispute.
(4) Committee :- Committee is also a party connected with any decision of the society as a body corporate. The society as body corporate is a distinct legal person and the committee members are distinct natural persons and in some cases committee members may be personally liable for the deeds rather misdeeds of the society. The definition of the word “committee” is given in section 2(5) which is reproduced herein below :
“Sec. 2(5) “committee” means the committee of management, or other directing body, to which the management of the affairs of a society is entrusted :”
Herein sec. past committee is also included. I Equally administrator or liquidator replaces
committee and enjoys all power of the committee and, therefore, liquidator/administrator is also include.
(5) Officer :- Any past or present officer is included as party to the dispute and the legal
representative of any deceased officer is also included as party under section 96. The definition of officer is given under sec. 2(14) of the act. It is reproduced as under :
Sec.2(14) :- “officer” means a person elected or appointed by a society to any office of such society according to its bye-laws and includes a chairman. vice-chairman, president vice president, managing director, manager, secretary, treasurer, member of committee, and any other person elected or appointed under this Act, the rules or the bye Laws, to give direction in regard to the business of such society; The officer includes all the committee members and officers, office bearers and they may be either elected or appointed by a society. The main criteria of officer are that he should be able to give direction in regard to the business of the society as per Act, Rules and the Bye-laws.
(6) Agent: – Any past or present agent, deceased agent is included in 96(1) (a) as parties to the dispute. However, these words are struck down as ultravires to the constitution Act. 14 by Hon. High Court in 1971 (XII)-GLR-P-355 as mentioned above along with the explanation II, wherein the definition of agent is given
(7) Member:- A member is included as party to the dispute and the liability and the rights of the member will be subject-matter of the dispute in which even past member or the deceased member can be joined as party. The act is also incorporated to protect the right of a person claiming through a member or past member or deceased member. Here, the situation of a society which is a member of other society is also included, However, if the society is, not a member of the other society, a dispute falls within the purview of Sec. 96(1) (e) which is struck down by hon’ble High Court in 1971 (XII)-GLR-355. It is also important to note that transactions with non-member u.s.
46 were sought to be covered u/s 96(1) (d); if he is a surety of a member of surety of a
nonmember. However such surety covered under section 96(i) (d) is now not covered since Sec. 96 (i) (d) is struck down as ultravires by hon’ble High Court in 1971 (XII)-GLR-355. Therefore, the surety will be covered only if he is a member himself in view of sec, 96(1)(b).
(8) Transactions – Qua Member:- It is possible that a person entered into a transaction with a proposed society which is subsequently registered and he incidentally becomes a member e.g. if a person enters into society in an agreement to sell (Satakhat) which is subsequently registered saledeed with a society, in which housing co-operative society is registered and the person joins the society as a member, he cannot sue the society for his outstanding dues of the contract of agreement of sale since it is not entered into the capacity of the member. Therefore the capacity in which the transaction is entered into with the society is important. In case, the member has two different distinct capacity in one capacity, he is either a land-lord or tenant of the society for hiring the premises and another capacity as member of the society, then the transaction in the capacity of
a member is covered under sec.96 of the Act and the transaction in a different distinct capacity other than a member which is not regular course of business between a member and society will not be covered under section 96. Similar case was decided by hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 1969-SC-1320 in case of Deccan mercantile co-operative Bank v/s Dalichand.
Membership on the Date of Transaction Relying upon AIR-1969-SC-1320 Deccan mercantile coop bank, the tribunal in a case of Vijay Cooperative Bank Ltd. In 30-CTD-95 came to the conclusion that if u person is not a member on the date of transaction and is subsequently made a member, then the transaction is not a qua-member,
therefore, the nominee has no jurisdiction. This judgment is thereafter followed consistently by Hon’ble Tribunal and similarly by the board of nominees creating great hardship to the cases of cooperative Banks.
It was a normal practice of a bank to take the loan applications along ,with membership application form, and enter into documents and release, the finance and the resolution of admission of membership was subsequently passed by the committee under rule 33. The bank have, therefore become alert not to repeat such type of mistake and have strictly followed the procedure of completion of membership, formalities first and thereafter completing the formalities of loan documents. However past cases of such mistake have all gone up to Hon’ble High Court in case of almost all the cooperative banks and the numerous petitions on similar subjects are pending before Hon’ble High Court for final decision.
Though the matter is sub-judice before Hon. High Court, it will be interesting to comment upon various aspects of the situation. In the case of Navdip Cooperative Bank in appeal No. 11 of 1994, decided on 11-3-96, the very issue was prominent in which two members of the bench differed arid the matter was referred to the Hon. President. Therefore this issue is discussed in detail in this judgment from all angles by three decisions in a single judgment of the Tribunal. Though the view of the president is final, the matter is again taken up before Hon’ble High Court as in another case. The original statute has intended to cover the transaction with non-members covered under section 46, by Section 96(1)(c)
which is struck down as ultravires in 1971 (XII)-GLA-355. The scope of the jurisdiction against the non-member is further reduced by narrow interpretation of membership on the date of transaction.
When a person applies for loan as well as for membership simultaneously the whole process of admission of member and granting of loan is a part of continuous transaction and cannot be separately dealt with to treat a person as non-member, relying upon AIR-1969 SC 1320. The judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court deals with a situation in which a person with two distinct capacity enters into the transactions with the society which is not qua member. In this situation, we can only hope that the Hon’ble High Court may resolve the issue to end up a state of confusion prevailing now before Board of Nominees and The Tribunal in similar cases. It is also important to appreciate the word “transaction”
of a bank with member in which the relation starts from the date of document or the date of membership, but the relation is a continuous relation that continues in all transactions reflected in the books of accounts and, therefore, the date of transaction also will not have a very narrow meaning as the date of document on which date membership has to be ensured according to the hon’ble Tribunal in Revision No. 58 of 1991, as mentioned above.
Dispute Regarding Service Matters Another important cause of controversial disputes arises from the service matters of the employees of the co-operative society which are mainly related to the service conditions prescribed by the contractual relations of appointment of the employee as well as the contractual relations arising in terms of the bye-laws. The bye laws are not enforceable by writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 or 227, as per the Hon. High Court judgment reported in 1976(XVII) GLR.53J (Rajabhai Ranmal Mori v. Members of the Managing Committee of Shri Una Taluka Sahakari.
Kharid Vechan Sangh) by which earlier judgment of 1973(XIV) GLR-786 (Lambha Vividh
Karykari Seva Sahakari Mandli v. Dist. Registrar) is overruled. Bye-laws have got no statutory force as per that judgment which is also confirmed by the Supreme Court judgment prior to 1976(XVII)-GLR-583 referred to above and subsequent to this judgments referred hereunder (1) AIR.1970-SG-245 (Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Addl. Industrial Tribunal, A.P.) .
(2) AIR-1984-SC-192 (Babaji Kondaj, Garad v. Nasik Merchants Co-op. Bank Ltd.)
The above views regarding enforceability of bye-law in 1973(XIV) GLR-786 and 1976(XVII)
GLR-503 are in the two different extremities and the importance of bye-laws are placed in the right perspective in 1977{XVIII) GLR-P.692 (Rajkot Nagrik Sahakari Bank Ltd. v. Rajkot Dist. Co-op. Bank Ltd.) 1996-(2)-GLR-433 : 1996( 1)GLH-753 (Ranuj Nagarik Sahakari Bank Ltd. v. State).
Therefore, bye-laws cannot be disregarded in the service matters by any authority like the
Registrar or the Registrar’s Nominee or the Tribunal and the misreading of bye-laws is considered as an error of law which can be interfered under supervisory jurisdiction by Hon’ble High Court under Art. 227. Keeping, this view in mind, the Hon. High Court recently in 1998-(3)-GLR-2318 in the case of Janata Cooperative Bank Dholka has confirmed the enforceability of bye-laws in the service matter.
Servant and Officers are parties enumerated in Section 96 as the parties to the dispute. The cases of misappropriation or recovery of some dues of the employees are covered under Section 96. The main controversy remains regarding jurisdiction, of the Board of Nominees and the Jurisdiction of Labour Court in general disputes.
SECTION 76 :-
Section-76 has made an enabling provision to prescribe service conditions by making rules and the last attempt was made on 18-1-94 by a draft notification which was not converted into final notification under sec. 168 of GCS Act. .Therefore, this draft notification has not taken the form of rules. However, it is important to note that the service conditions are under the ambit, of cooperative law. Service condition as referred to in the bye-laws and the disputes regarding the conditions certainly touches the management if not the business or the constitution. Similar view has been expressed by the Rajasthan High Court in AIR-1991-RAJ-121. Para-12. Therefore, in the humble opinion of the authors, the disputes relating to the relations of the servants and officers of the society with the society are covered under section 96 and the Board of Nominees has jurisdiction to deal with such disputes. Similar view has been recently expressed in above referred judgment in 1998-(3)GLR-2318.
However, in P.R. Mankad’s case in AIR-1979-SC-1203, 1979-GLR-701 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the co-operative law is a general law and the labour law is a special law dealing with the special disputes. Therefore, only labour court has jurisdiction and not the Board of Nominees.
With due respect to Hon’ble Supreme Court, the author submits that the society has a right to recover its normal dues as well as the dues arising out of misappropriation or misconduct from the employees for which the forum of Board of Nominees is available. However, if the servant or the officers of the society are excluded from available forum of Board of Nominees for recovering their dues from the society arising out of service conditions or bye-laws, the same will be violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, it is necessary to have a thorough look at the position of the statutory provisions and the case law and make a sharp distinction of purely labour disputes and the disputes arising out of contract in terms of service conditions and bye-laws. The Labour Court may allowed to deal with disciplinary matters whereas mutual finical obligations may be allowed to be entertained by the learned Board of Nominees. It is also important to note that the draft rules made under Section 76 read with Section 168 of GCS Act made provisions for dealing with service matters also and in the last rule, there was provision to refer the dispute to the learned Board of Nominee under section 96.
However, if the draft rules are made final by any subsequent attempt, the question remains whether Section 96 itself as interpreted by hon’ble Supreme Court in P.R. Mankad’s case reported in 1979(XX)-GLR-701 conferring no jurisdiction to learned
Nominees, whether the jurisdiction can be resumed by, the rules under section 76; i.e. when the statute does not confer the jurisdiction, the rules cannot confirm the jurisdiction since rules are subordinate Legislation to the original statute. Therefore, the controversy needs to be resolved regarding the jurisdiction of the Board of Nominee for service matters since the jurisdiction of the labour court covers only employees below certain pay-scale and parties to the dispute under sec. 96 covers servants and/or officers, they may not be rendered remedy less.
Jurisdiction of Registrar V/S Jurisdiction of Learned Nominees
There are two machineries prescribed under the GCS Act with provision of appeal and revision.
Looking to such provision of the Act, Hon’ble High Court in 1978(XIX)-GLR-92 (Jintendra Natvarlal Thaker v. Hirabag Co-op. Housing Society), has held that the Board of Nominees has no jurisdiction for the disputes arising out of the application of Section 36, 23, 11 etc. for which the Registrar has the jurisdiction and the separate machinery for appeal and revision is prescribed under the law. Similar view can be taken for the powers of Registrar under Section 106, 139 etc. However, in case of the resolution of expulsion under Sec. 36 the resolution is a business of the society and it has been held by Hon. Tribunal in revision No. 75 of 1988, that the Nominee has jurisdiction for challenging the resolution before the resolution is submitted to the District Registrar for approval. The jurisdiction of the Registrar i.e. ‘District Registrar starts when the resolution reaches the Registrar/District Registrar and the jurisdiction of Nominee ends. This view was referred to by the Tribunal in Revision No.106 of 1994 by judgment dated 28-6-95 in/the case of Swami Gunalitnagar Soc. Review application No. 20 of 1995 decided on 15-9-97 is allowed by Hon. Tribunal and the decision of the same is stayed by Hon.
High Court in SCA No. 7535 of 1997.
Jurisdiction of Learned Nominee in Sucession Matters Section 31 confers powers to the society to act upon the Nomination for admitting legal heirs of the deceased member and also confers the power on the society in absence of nomination to make reasonable inquiry and admit legal heir as member. However, in case of disputed questions of Legal heirship, the learned Nominee has no jurisdiction to decide the succession matters for which a special court and special law is in force. Since succession law is a special law and to-operative law is general law for succession matters, special law prevails and, therefore the learned Nominee has no jurisdiction.
This view was expressed by Tribunal in Appeal No. 307 of 1995 & 311 of 1995 decided on 9-5-97. 2004(1) GLR-337 V/S P.B. Vagadia-sec-98(1). Jurisdiction to Challenge the Validity of Bye-Laws As mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the bye-laws are in the nature of contract as in the case of articles of association as per the reported of Hon. High Court in 1976(XVII)-GLR-583. The validity of bye-laws can be challenged under section 153 for which time-limit of two months has been prescribed and the revision application lies under Sec. 155 before State Government. We may contemplate a situation in which bye-laws are contrary to Act and Rules as it happened in 1975(XVII)-GLR-382 (Ambalal Manilal Makwana v. Khambhat Taluka Sahakari Vechan Sangh). In such a situation when the
actual byelaws are in force in an election matter in which a member is deprived of his important rights to vote or contest the election, his cause of actions is related to the bye-laws which he would take up as a dispute under section 96 together with challenge of validity of bye-laws. If the bye-laws are ultravires to act and rules they can be challenged at any time as and when the cause of action arises by enforcement of bye-laws which are in the nature of contract interse between the member and the society. In the humble opinion of the authors, the time limit of challenge of bye-laws under section 153
and the authority of the Additional Registrar under Sec. 153 will not come in the way of ,the jurisdiction of the learned, Nominee for entertaining the dispute under section 96 for the validity of bye-laws which are ultravires to act and rules. The contract as prescribed under bye-laws gives rise to cause of action and the dispute as and when it is enforced and the members may choose to challenge the same as and when he is aggrieved by enforcement. Our view finds support by Hon’bIe High Court judgment reported in 1975(XVI)-GLR382.
Jurisdiction for the Election Dispute Petitions
Before 1982, all the election disputes were entertained by the learned Nominee under section 96 and as per 1975(XVI)-GLR-1058, the dispute were entertainable before the election is concluded. After the amending Act 1982 under which the Chapter XI (A) is added for the specified society listed under Section 74 (c), the situation has changed for the specified society whose election is conducted by the Collector. The provisions of Chapter XI (A) and the provision of rules under Section 145(Y) i.e.
Gujarat Specified Co-operative Societies Elections to Committee Rules 1982 are parallel to the provisions under Representation of Peoples Act 1951. Section 145(U) takes away the powers of learned Nominee under section 96 to entertain election petitions for the specified societies for which Tribunal is vested with original jurisdiction to entertain such petitions. However, it is important to note that the distinct features under which learned Nominee U/S 96 is still having original jurisdiction to entertain election disputes touching to the elections of specified societies which are mentioned as under:
(I) In case of the specified society which is also a federal society having affiliated societies as its members, the representatives of the affiliated society will be nominated by the affiliated society by a resolution and the voters list of the federal society will contain the names of the societies as well as the name of the representatives as decided in 1975(XVI)GLR-382. The challenge of validity of such resolutions for nomination of representative to the federal society will lie before the learned Nominee under Section 96.
(II) In the case of federal society having individual members, who have representatives in the general body as well as in the committee through their delegates, the election of delegates amongst individual members is not an election as per Section 14S-B(b), and, therefore, the same is required to be conducted by the society and not by the Collector. As per the judgment of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court reported in 1983 (2) GLR 1301 : 1983 GLH – 1080 (Hasmukhbhai Jugatram Raval v. The Collector, Surat) and unreported judgment of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court Division Bench in SCA No. 8356 of 92 and 8083 of 92 the election of delegates cannot be conducted by the Collector. Therefore, if any dispute arises out of election of delegates, the same is not covered under Section -145(U) and it can be referred to under Section 96. Election petition before the Tribunal lies only against the election of managing committee. Therefore, the role of Collector in the election process in the case of specified federal society starts only after the election of delegates from individual members and the resolutions by the affiliated societies nominating their
members. If there is a dispute relating to this process, the same can be referred to Board of Nominee under Section 96 and not to the Tribunal under Section 145-U (III) The election process starts by the Collector by publication of notification under Rule 16 of the
Gujarat Specified Societies Election to Committee Rules and that election process is concluded by the declaration of result under Rule 62 of Specified Societies Committee rules. Thereafter, the election of office bearers is held under Section 14S-z, for which again the dispute will lie before, the Nominee under Section 96
(IV) Therefore, in such cases, the Tribunal will have only revision/appeal jurisdiction and accordingly Tribunal has entertained revision application No. 4 of 94 decided on 4-8 95 reported in 34- CTD.70.
Disputes Against A Firm
Under the Partnership Act, the decree against a firm can be executed against the property of the firm as well as from the personal property of the partners and the liability of the partners are joint and several and the liability is unlimited except in case of insolvency of one or more of the partners in which case the liability will be shifted to the remaining partners. Therefore, in lavad case when award or decree is sought against the firm, the partners are interested in the property of (he firm and decree also affects the
partners by virtue of their unlimited personal liability over and above the liability of the firm. In this background of the Section 25 and 49 of Partnership Act 1932, it will be important to examine the parties to the disputes, when the firm is a member and the partners are not members of the society in a suit by a co-operative bank against the firm for the dues of the bank. It is very clear that in view of Section 99(3) (a) the partners are interested in the property of the firm and, therefore, they will have to be joined as parties to the dispute.
If the firm is a member and the partners are not members, partners are claiming their rights through firm and, therefore, also they are covered Section 96(1) (b) as well as Section 99 (3) (a).
In view of the above discussion, it is also important to note that the decree against I firm can be executed against partners from their personal property after the firm’s property is applied for payment of debts. Therefore when the partners are made liable to the unlimited extent under partnership act for the dues of the firm, they are covered under Section 99(3) (c) also which is paramateria same as CPC Order 1 Rule 10.
In view of above discussion, the! Tribunal has held in 2S-CTD-G7 that the Nominee has jurisdiction against the partners, when the firm is a member and the partners are not members of the society.
The Cooption of A Committee Member
The cooption of a committee member on a vacant seat of the director is an issue before the Nominee and Nominee has jurisdiction so far as the specified societies arc concerned, the Societies Election to Committee rules 1982 Rule that no cooption can be made on a vacant seat of the Moreover, as decided in the case of Bhogilal Patel v/s Yusuf Gaziawala reported in 1971 (XII) G.L.R. 215 nominated director by institution or by the Government should not hold disqualification as per the Act, Rules and bye-laws
The jurisdiction against the legal heirs of the deceased member :
In a money suit, the legal heirs of the deceased are covered under, section 96(1) (b) but the real question is the limitation regarding the liability, of the deceased. As regards the limitation for the dues of the society from the member, Section 34(a), the liability of the member is unlimited and Sec. 34(b) prescribes limited liability for a period of three years in case of the liability of deceased member for the debts of the society to the third party. This has been interpreted in details in 27-CTD-81, 3.2-CTD-262.
However, the liability of the legal heirs shall attach to the estate of the deceased as per the section 34 as well as CPC Sec. 50(2). In short the limitation is liberal and unlimited against the heirs of the deceased.
However, the liability is limited to the extent of the estate of the deceased.
Annual General Meeting The general Body is supreme authority under Sec. 73 and exercises the powers through general meeting. There are four kinds of general meeting prescribed under the Act and Rules,
(1) First General Meeting under Rule 5
(2) Last General meeting under section 114(3) before cancellation of the society to consider the final report of the Liquidator.
(3) Annual general Meeting under section77.
(4) Special general meeting under section 78 since the general body is supreme authority for internal management of the society; the general body cannot be restrained to function by any kind of stay order against holding of a general meeting
AGM exercises certain statutory functions prescribed under section 77 and also transacts special business like amendment of bye-laws etc, Restraining AGM to conduct lawful business is also violative to article 19(1) (c) of the constitution. The general body should be allowed to consider and contemplate any agenda and ordinarily should be allowed to take the decision by democratic process and thereafter, the decision of the general meeting can only be a subject matter of the dispute. Therefore, normally
instead of granting the stay against considering any agenda it should be allowed to consider and the decision only can be challenged as dispute and examined on merits. However, purely unlawful agenda may b8 restrained e.g. if the society wants to consider an agenda to start a business prohibited by law like smuggling etc.
In short an agenda in general meeting cannot be restrained and members should be free to consider any agenda by a democratic process and the decision only should be made a subject matter or the dispute under section 96 and a dispute regarding the agenda is premature before actually passing through a democratic process of decision making.